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Modern network infrastructures host converged applications that demand rapid elasticity of services, increased security and ultra-fast 
reaction times. The Tactile Internet promises to facilitate the delivery of these services while enabling new economies of scale for 
high-fdelity of machine-to-machine and human-to-machine interactions. Unavoidably, critical mission systems served by the Tactile 
Internet manifest high-demands not only for high speed and reliable communications but equally, the ability to rapidly identify 
and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a novel Multi-Agent Data Exfltration Detector Architecture (MADEX) 
inspired by the mechanisms and features present in the human immune system. MADEX seeks to identify data exfltration activities 
performed by evasive and stealthy malware that hides malicious trafc from an infected host in low-latency networks. Our approach 
uses cross-network trafc information collected by agents to efectively identify unknown illicit connections by an operating system 
subverted. MADEX does not require prior knowledge of the characteristics or behaviour of the malicious code or a dedicated access to 
a knowledge repository. We tested the performance of MADEX in terms of its capacity to handle real-time data and the sensitivity of 
our algorithm’s classifcation when exposed to malicious trafc. Experimental evaluation results show that MADEX achieved 99.97% 
sensitivity, 98.78% accuracy and an error rate of 1.21% when compared to its best rivals. We created a second version of MADEX, 
called MADEX level 2 that further improves its overall performance with a slight increase in computational complexity. We argue for 
the suitability of MADEX level 1 in non-critical environments, while MADEX level 2 can be used to avoid data exfltration in critical 
mission systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the frst article in the literature that addresses the detection of rootkits real-time 
in an agnostic way using an artifcial immune system approach while it satisfes strict latency requirements. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, the cyberspace has experienced an increase in the use of technology for information processing at a 
scale never seen before [38]. The number of Internet users is now growing by an average of more than one million new 
digital citizens daily [41]. Also, companies use the Internet as the de-facto communication medium to transmit sensitive 
business information within a fragmented legal and regulatory landscape on how this information should be governed 
[42]. Meanwhile, many governments use the Internet to receive and deliver private information to their citizens or 
government departments, agencies and public bodies [44]. This has created a unique and hybrid ecosystem with 
cyberspace at its core as part of the information generation and exchange processes [12]. Furthermore, the exponential 
increase of mission-critical applications with delay sensitivity and strict delivery and security requirements has 
necessitated the development of sensors and actuators with intelligent signal processing and decision-making capabilities 
[8]. The deployment of these tactical sensing devices has also driven the development of appropriate infrastructure 
capabilities to enable human-to-machine (H2M) and machine-to-machine (M2M) tactile sensing transmissions via the 
Internet at large scale and quantities [37]. The need and vision for such infrastructures, namely, the Tactile Internet, 
were partially created due to technological and scientifc breakthrough in telecommunication protocols, increased 
demand for near real-time applications and autonomous sensing and decision-making with specifc Quality of Service 
(QoS) requirements. Figure 1 shows a high-level description of the Tactile Internet architecture [4]. 
The use of the Tactile Internet (TI) although promises to couple physical and logical security while balancing strict 
quality and delivery requirements, however, has also become an operation theatre for organized cybercrime rings (OCR) 
to support how they orchestrate their illicit activities [74]. This is because interconnections between H2M and M2M 
communications create attack surfaces against the TI infrastructure while new economies of scale emerge for OCR to 
proft [26]. These activities often involve the deployment of advanced malware such as rootkits that manifests stealthy 
characteristics to cover up malicious tasks in a compromised system [46, 67]. The term rootkit in modern malware 
refers to modules responsible for hiding the presence of malicious code [55]. Rootkits perform changes on the OS at 
the kernel level, subverting them in a deep way that renders malware detection solutions inefcient. This scenario 
is aggravated when malware contemplating rootkit modules are part of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) [3, 18] 
campaign, where the adversary is supported by an organisation, and has a high technical knowledge. These evasive 
techniques can be further supported by the ultra-high-speed capability of TI and the integration of diferent back-end to 
support its main functionalities. Also, the integration of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and Internet of Things (IoT) 
inherently transfers threats and vulnerabilities in existing authentication and security controls currently deployed in TI. 
These include but not limited to denial-of-service (DoS), impersonation attacks, privileged-insider attacks, MITM and 
replay attacks [69]. Also, traditional malware analysis approaches are usually based on static, dynamic and behavioural 
patterns techniques. These approaches have weaknesses that tend to increase the detection time signifcantly and 
renders them inefective in detecting unknown infections (0-day) in real-time critical mission systems [17, 60]. 
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Fig. 1. High-level Architecture of Tactile Internet 
The Tactile Internet promises to enhance capabilities under single planning, synchronisation, and integration 
platform. Several systems within this environment execute essential and to a certain degree critical mission activities 
and operations. Most of these systems preserve a physical, information, and cognitive dimension when they operate 
within the cyberspace. Also, they are subject to various direct or indirect threats that can lead to denial efects such 
as degradation and disruption. The efect on the systems can cause catastrophic consequences to business operations 
and impact signifcantly the critical national infrastructure while afecting also the environment and human lives and 
activities. Table 1 presents the quality and security characteristics of TI. 
Table 1. Qality and security characteristics of Tactile Internet 
Tactile Internet Characteristics 
Quality Security 
Ultra-responsive network connectivity is essential for Security of communications (cryptographic routines) 
haptic interaction and mission-critical communications without violating the low latency requirements 
High reliability of the entire system (end-to-end) Availability and dependability from attacks 
Efcient network design and data type prioritization to Authentication embedded in the physical transmission 
achieve latency reduction to avoid high end-to-end latency 
High data throughput rates capacity Malicious activities detection in a timely manner 
H2M/M2M coexistence Resilience facing attacks and malfunction/disruption sce-
narios 
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Existing detection techniques based on artifcial immune systems (AIS) are increasingly developed to improve the 
detection accuracy and response time against polymorphic infections while reducing false alarms. An AIS is described 
as a computational system mimicking the immune system and its adaptation to rapidly changing conditions with 
applications to decision making and problem-solving [23]. Traditional approaches, such as self-nonself theory and 
danger theory (DT), have been used to develop algorithms to solve anomaly detection problems in modern computing 
[7, 27]. Their application ranges from the identifcation of software vulnerabilities to the detection of attack variants 
including denial-of-service (DoS) and Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [9, 53]. 
Our work seeks to contribute to the identifcation of stealthy malware activities and detect data exfltration in 
controlled networks with high-speed, ultra-low latency requirements. This problem is complex due to the motivation 
and technical ability of the adversaries, which can develop novel techniques to neutralise the defences of the target 
network. Therefore, we propose a multi-agent immune inspired architecture able to identify malicious activities of 
data exfltration with details related to the assets involved, as well as temporality, frequency and volume analysis 
with regards to the malicious trafc. Another important feature of our solution is its ability to detect command and 
control channels (C2) [13], even when the malware goes unnoticed by the local defences. For instance, cases in which a 
threat vector manifests rootkit features and tries to hide its outgoing trafc from a compromised node of the system. 
Sophisticated malware can use encryption to protect their communications. Therefore, we chose to use a fow-based 
approach [64], where the packet inspection only collects the header information and does not analyse the payload. In 
addition, because the fow-based strategy is computationally inexpensive and agnostic to packet contents, it can be 
used in high-speed networks and in scenarios where privacy is important [15]. 
Our approach does not prevent malware infection per se, but identify and block data exfltration after a successful 
system compromise. We recognize that intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) [54, 59] are essential to 
network security, but eventually the opponent will be able to transpose the defences of the target and the algorithmic 
processes linking the alert generation [24]. Our work is inspired by the defence mechanisms of the human body, 
specifcally metaphors related to the lymphatic system, which is an important part of the human immune system (HIS). 
Therefore, in the domain of Computer science, to be able to mimic the features and characteristics observed in the HIS, 
a model of an artifcial immune system (AIS) is needed. AIS comprises of intelligent methodologies inspired by the HIS 
to address a specifc problem [28]. In the cybersecurity domain, AIS aims to preserve and encode the existing features 
in the HIS such as distributed structure, adaptability, memory, pattern recognition, self-regulation and resilience. The 
main objective of this research is to identify malicious trafc concealed by rootkits near real-time with an agnostic 
approach related to protocols, cryptographic primitives and malware characteristics. Tables 2, 3 present our MADEX 
contributions and metrics respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the state-of-the-art in 
fow-based trafc classifcation schemes, multi-agent architectures and artifcial immune systems. Section 3 presents 
our MADEX architecture and its associated Lymph Node Algorithm with connections to the TI. Our algorithm is 
inspired by the interactions that occur inside the lymph node and the characteristics of a lymphatic system, such as the 
unidirectionality and segregation of the lymph, the fltering that occurs inside the lymph node, where a system entity is 
responsible for identifying signals, and the actual immune reaction when it perceives patterns that indicate cellular 
distress. Section 4 exhibits details about our testbed, with regards to the experiments, network topology and scenarios. 
In Section 5 we present the performance analysis and results extracted by the Lymph Node Algorithm developed and 
its comparison against the state-of-the-art. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work. 
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Table 2. MADEX Contributions in covert channel identification 
MADEX Key Contributions 
Contribution(s) Description 
1 A decentralized detection architecture that can identify malicious trafc even if the host is 
unable to characterise or perceive the malicious trafc 
2 Near real-time detection is achieved for a variety of trafc fows 
3 The approach does not require previous knowledge repository or training 
4 When subverting the OS concealing trafc information, the covert channel should be detected 
5 Privacy-preserving (e.g. No need to perform packet inspection or payload decryption) 
6 Platform independent 
7 Low computational cost and complexity 
8 Agnostic to the type of rootkits used or current techniques applied to conceal trafc 
Table 3. MADEX Metrics 
MADEX Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Metrics 
Metrics Description 
Frequency How often malicious trafc has been observed in a time window 
Volume How much data was exfltrated in a time window 
Time The start and end time of the malicious communication (covert channel activation period) 
Attribution Identify the origin and destination of malicious trafc 
2 RELATED WORK 
2.1 Flow-based analysis 
In recent years, several works have been conducted using fow-based analysis techniques due to the challenges imposed 
by high-speed networks with regards to the exponential increase of network throughput. This kind of analysis uses 
a scalable method to reduce the trafc volume into fows [39]. According to [19], a fow is a set of packets or frames 
passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. The authors still declare that packets 
belonging to a particular fow present a similar set of characteristics related to packet header information or a derived 
feld from packet processing (for instance, packets in the same fow have equal source and destination IP addresses). 
The fow-based analysis is a convenient approach to detect malicious trafc in the context of the TI networks because 
this approach makes it possible to minimize the amount of data to be processed. 
In the context of Command & Control (C2) channel identifcation, this approach is justifed since it does not require 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to identify malicious trafc. Thus, it is applicable in scenarios where the adversary seeks 
to protect communications using strong cryptographic primitives. Moreover, these approaches can be used in near 
real-time detection systems due to their low computational cost. Because of those important fow-based characteristics, 
they can be applied also on high-speed backbone links [64]. On the other hand, the diversity of information collected in 
package headers is quite limited. The authors in [62] proposed a scheme that fnds recurring and regular time interval 
trafc. The approach still uses fows to fnd similarities between multiple instances of fows and infer communication 
patterns whereas the authors in [51] proposed a behavioural learning fow-based model. The authors developed BASTA 
(behavioural Analytics System using Timed Automata), which uses probabilistic deterministic real-time automata 
(PDRTAs) to detect infected hosts and identify unseen infections in networks. Narang et al. [49] introduced the usage 
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of 2-tuple (source IP, destination IP) instead of the traditional fow-based 5-tuple (source IP, source port, destination IP, 
destination port, protocol) to diferentiate legitimate P2P trafc from a malicious one. In this way, they created PeerShark, 
whose strategy is focused on observing the diferent communication between peers. PeerShark can categorise P2P 
trafc with more than 95% accuracy. 
Vance [66] presented an alternative algorithm derived from fow-based attributes deployed in the detection of 
APT. Their results indicate that statistical modelling of APT communications can successfully develop deterministic 
characteristics for detection. Burghouwt et al. [11] proposed a novel approach to real-time detection of C2 channels 
based on trust of trafc destinations. In the approach, a destination can become trusted by transitivity, if its origin 
can be evaluated by another trusted entity. The main contribution of [16] was an algorithm that performs DNS trafc 
monitoring in large networks based on the extension of standard fows. The authors in [15] presented NEMEA, a 
modular framework for network trafc analysis at Layer 7 that uses the stream-wise concept, i. e. data is analysed 
continuously in the memory with minimal data storage required. Finally, Berkay Celik et al. [10] modelled a fow-based 
framework that uses tamper-resistant features at the transport layer to protect against rootkits. 
2.2 Rootkits 
The term rootkit refers to a specifc type of software that intent to conceal the adversary presence and malicious 
activities from the defence mechanisms of a victim system [30]. The author in [68], presents fve categories of rootkits 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Rootkit categories by target level 
Category Description 
Application Substitutes a vital application by another with similar functionality which is capable of con-
cealing information. For instance, in a Linux system it could replace the “ls” application to 
provide fake information to the user. cb-r00tkit [56] is an instance of application rootkit 
Library Subvert the OS standard system calls/APIs to avoid exposing sensitive attack information like 
modify the loaded API which is responsible to modify registry entries on the Windows OS 
default registry editor “regedit.exe” to conceal specifc registry records for example. R77 [29] 
can be characterized as a library rootkit 
Kernel Perform modifcations into device drivers or in the kernel data structure. Kernel-level rootkits 
are located deep into the OS functionalities, rendering detection very challenging. Suteresu 
[21] is an example of kernel rootkit. 
Virtualization This category targets a running instance of the OS into a virtual machine acting as a hypervisor, 
with absolute control of the victim, raising the detection difcult to a high new level. “Blue Pill” 
[65] can be used as an example of this kind of rootkit 
Hardware Use hardware devices to deploy rootkit code. Because this kind of rootkit resides in hardware 
devices and does not change any part of the OS, libraries or applications, the majority of 
the rootkit detection approaches present in current literature are inefective in this category. 
Cloaker [22] is a hardware rootkit 
Process hiding, function subversion and trafc concealing are some classic rootkit functionalities to make their 
components undetectable by users and system monitoring tools. Often, the malware tries to conceal malicious system 
processes and modules modifying essential data structures present in the OS. Another common technique is the 
modifcation of system functions to collect sensitive data from the victim host. Some rootkits subvert the OS to hide 
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network trafc from the user in order to remain unnoticed when it exfltrates sensitive information or receive new 
instructions from the attacker. 
2.3 Multi-agent Architectures 
The concept of MAS in the development of the MADEX architecture is fundamental due to its ability to solve complex 
problems with distributed characteristics [40]. The authors in [5] proposed a real-time multi-agent system for an 
adaptive intrusion detection system (RTMAS-AIDS). It consists of a detection model (multi-level hybrid support vector 
machines and extreme learning machine) and an adaptive model (single SVM classifer) respectively. This method is 
AIS-based where the distributed agents are modelled to detect unknown attacks in real-time. The system achieved an 
overall accuracy level of 95.86% with a false-alarm rate of 2.13%. The proposed model requires more training to detect 
unknown threats. 
Seresht and Azmi [57] proposed a distributed intrusion detection system using a multi-agent AIS approach (MAIS-
IDS). It is a hybrid anomaly IDS that analyses system-setting and network trafc. The network analysis was carried 
out using virtual machines (VM) where agents use immune paradigms to improve their populations, defne domains 
and to establish collaborative tasks related to detection. Compared with a similar system with no communication 
between the virtual machine agents, MAIS-IDS decreased the false alarms rates signifcantly using efective multi-agent 
communication and collaboration between the VMs. The system needs to perform 2 phases of training to maximise its 
capabilities. 
2.4 Artificial Immune Systems 
The HIS is a rich source of inspiration because it demonstrates several desirable facets to a malware detection system that 
include self-learning, self-adaption, fault tolerance, pattern recognition, memory and distributed processing. Immune-
inspired algorithms have contributed to the felds of optimisation, classifcation and anomaly detection [50]. Besides, 
the potential and complexity of biological systems surpass the technological strategies known today. Elucidating and 
attempting to understand the mechanisms and functionalities of natural systems can lead to the development of new 
forms of engineering [70]. 
Some of the most signifcant benefts of AIS approach in malware detection is the natural potential to deal with 
complex scenarios and perform distributed decisions. Those AIS characteristics increase the capacity to achieve a 
macro-perspective over infections and attacks supported by malware in large infrastructures. Additionally, it eliviates 
the necessity to process a large amount of data in a centralized way, providing independent decisions about local 
information as seen in nature [25]. These characteristics are desirable in the context of IT malware detection architecture 
due to the strict low latency requirements. 
There are four classic paradigms published in the public domain, namely Negative Selection, Clonal Selection, 
Immune Network and Danger Theory [28, 45]. The Danger Theory (DT) was selected in our work because it adequately 
addresses inconsistencies and contests some aspects related to the traditional self/non-self approaches. In DT, a key 
concept is that the immune responses are not triggered by the presence of a foreign entity in the body, but rather, they 
constitute a reaction linked to a cell sufering. When cells are under stress, they emit danger signals (DS). The authors 
suggest that the HIS reacts to DS and not to the presence of foreign entities. This theory is based on the observation 
that the body does not attack everything that is foreign (e.g., intestinal fora microorganisms). However, the immune 
system can measure the amount of DS, and if it reaches a certain threshold, an immune response is triggered. Otherwise, 
the response will be suppressed (immune tolerance). DT-based algorithms try to simulate DS and the DC to achieve 
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agent capacity on diferentiation, learning and decrease false alarm rates. The design principles of this model are highly 
infuenced by the DC,which monitors host tissue for potential indication of cells damage. There are several diferent 
approaches for malware detection using immunology-based techniques. However, to limit the scope of this paper, we 
will only cite those who adopted the DT paradigm. 
Zekri and Souici-Meslati [73] proposed two algorithms: the frst one was based on the DT (DCA) and the second one 
was based on a Negative Selection algorithm (NSA) to detect intrusions. The DCA has raised no false alarms while the 
NSA issued a large number of those, rendering it unreliable and inadequate for anomaly-based detection. The authors 
also concluded that DCA handles large data sets correctly. Mohamad Mohsin et al. [47] proposes and a novel outbreak 
detection model based on DT. It comprises of four processes: data gathering, signal formalisation, outbreak mining, and 
outbreak analysis. The DCA has been utilised as the main detection algorithm. Although, there is no training phase 
involved, the DT-based out-break detection model is able to handle new unknown outbreak patterns. 
The authors in [43] developed a model to detect intrusion in WSN. The solution has two layers namely danger 
perception and control decision. The detection strategy still has a multi-node cooperation mechanism embedded as part 
of their solution. The authors concluded that the proposed model (DT-based) is better than the Self-NonSelf (SNS) model 
in terms of false-negative rates, false-positive rates and energy consumption. In [6], the DT paradigm was adopted 
to secure a WSN. The model is based on monitoring parameters such as energy, the volume of data and frequency of 
data transfer, creating an output based on their weights and concentrations. Shamshirband et al. [58] aimed to design a 
cooperative multi-agent-based fuzzy artifcial immune system (Co-FAIS) to protect wireless sensor nodes. Co-FAIS is 
implemented in the Low Energy Adaptive and reinforce Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) protocol, and this theoretic 
defence mechanism system combines the cooperative-based artifcial immune theory with fuzzy Q-learning algorithmic 
elements. 
2.4.1 Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). The DCA is developed for anomaly detection and its frst prototype implementa-
tion was presented in [34]. A mature PoC was tested in a system capable of detecting malicious activity in real-time 
in [36]. The authors in [32] described the algorithm in-depth. The algorithm was developed based on the functions 
and behaviour observed in the DC, which are entities of the human immune system responsible for identifying signals 
that indicate intruders in the human body. In addition, DCs are able to combine the perceived signals in the body and 
produce their own output signal, that will be used as input by other entities to initiate the immune response. Thus, the 
DC can be defned as an agent that identifes intruders in the human body. The DCA has advantages when applied to 
systems that seek to detect real-time security threats because it requires little computing power and a short training 
period. It makes use of artifcial dendritic cells (aDC) that will be responsible for processing signal information and 
evidence referring to the behaviour of biological DC. aDC will process the data received and if it identifes danger 
signals, it will change its state to mature, and this state change will trigger an immune response. On the other hand, it 
may also become semi-mature, which is a state that suppresses the Immunological defence. In other words, it seeks to 
correlate the fow of data collected in aDC and label groups of similar signals, such as the biological DC. The artifcial 
mechanism of the DCA works as follows: The artifcial dendritic cell (aDC) fuses the data collected by the sensors 
and within a pre-defned time frame. Then, the results obtained by the perception of the aDC are compiled and the 
correlated signals obtain an anomaly index. A clear description of the algorithm (e.g. signals, metaphors, data processing 
and equations) can be found in [35]. 
2.4.2 Deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm (dDCA). The algorithm proposed in [33] is a deterministic version of the 
DCA. Despite the advantages that DCA has in terms of low computational cost and limited training periods, however, 
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it makes use of many input parameters and stochastic elements while increasingly being criticised due to its empirical 
parameter selection process. In order to better control and measure the system and improve performance, a DCA variant 
called Deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm (dDCA) was introduced. dDCA manifests certain advantages over DCA 
such as the reduction of parameters from 10 derived from empirical and biological observations to 3 parameters only. 
Besides that, some metrics were also implemented to demonstrate higher sensitivity and lower classifcation fuctuation 
when compared to DCA. 
3 MADEX 
This section presents the MADEX architecture in which we model the diferent types and interactions between agents, 
immune metaphors, malicious activity detection and data processing using the factors discussed in [71]. Modelling a 
multi-agent architecture facilitates the process of entities creation, aiming for a better simulation of the HIS behaviour to 
exhibit its interactions, functionalities and to visualise links to the TI. For a complete list of the specifcations, structure 
and operation of generic agent-based architecture, the reader is encouraged to review work in [72]. 
In our work, MADEX is classifed as a hybrid architecture, because the agents perform reactive tasks based on rules 
and represent a symbolic model of the world (immune metaphor). Pattern matching and symbolic manipulations are 
used to perform cognitive tasks such as deciding whether to isolate, or not, other network nodes. A MAS defnes 
the roles that an agent can adopt and the tasks associated with each role. Furthermore, it also defnes how agents 
communicate among themselves and deal with confict resolution such as negotiation among agents (see [14]) or based 
on a pre-defned division of work. The MADEX architecture is an example of the latter case. We also use the Cassiopeia 
method [20] to model our agents with a distinction made between Elementary behaviours, Relational behaviours 
(collective tasks) and Organisational behaviours. The MADEX architecture has two types of agents: 1) “Collectors” 
to perceive and fetch the required data and signals, and 2) “Auditors” to identify illicit trafc. The Organisational 
behaviours require cooperation among both types of agents. Any agent could alert other nodes about illicit trafc and 
deny communication to a compromised host. We describe the two types of agents as follows: 
(1) Collector Agent (CA): Responsible to execute Data collection, store the information collected and blocks 
communication with compromised hosts. The CAs are deployed in every monitored system in the network. 
Metaphorically, this agent corresponds to the biological DC, a cell that collects information and signals in the 
human body tissues. In the context of MADEX, this agent must run without administrator privileges, and will 
update a database with the perceived network trafc destined to the external network when requested by the 
AA. 
(2) Auditor Agent (AA): This agent performs the analysis of the collected data, notify other agents about the 
knowledge produced and blocks communication with compromised hosts. It must be deployed on the system(s) 
located at the boundaries of the local network to observe all outgoing trafc. This agent must be strategically 
positioned where the local network trafc fow can be audited and controlled. Thus, the AA will interact with 
the CA to identify what trafc is perceived by the latter. If the CA does not perceive an outgoing connection, 
that might indicate that malware is hiding network trafc where the CA is installed. 
The simplest communication scenario for MADEX exists with one system to protect, one AA installed at the border 
asset, and one CA on the monitored machine as demonstrated in Figure 2. Any trafc from the monitored machine 
must be forwarded by the border asset where the AA is installed. Once trafc fow is detected (step 1), the AA queries a 
list (step 3) of pre-identifed illicit connections (Blacklist). If the connection is Blacklisted, the AA will prevent further 
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access to the external network. Otherwise, the AA will query the list of CA known connections (Whitelist). If the 
connection is present in the Whitelist, then external access will be permitted. If the AA-aware connection is not present 












Fig. 2. MADEX Communications 
Upon completion of the Whitelist update, the CA informs the AA. Furthermore, the AA will check again if the 
perceived trafc is in the Whitelist (step 3). If the AA fnds references to trafc destined for the external network on the 
Whitelist, this indicates that the CA is aware of the connection and there is no hint of trafc concealment. However, if 
the trafc cannot be linked to references in the Whitelist, then the CA is unaware of the connection, which indicates a 
potential malicious trafc concealment activity. As such, the connection will be added to the Blacklist. When Blacklisted 
trafc is identifed to exceeds the system’s acceptable threshold, a Warning will be sent to the other agents to decide 
whether or not to quarantine the node fagged by the warning message. Furthermore, if there are packets perceived 
by the AA originated from the CA host and unknown to the latter agent, the AA will warn all the other agents that 
collectively decide whether or not to quarantine the node indicated by the warning message. 
Computer networks can provide various types of delays [61]. Therefore, there is the possibility of the system 
mistakenly identifying an illicit signal due to a delay in processing or receiving the information that it is actually a 
licit signal. This situation is undesirable because it may lead to a false-positive condition. For this reason, the system 
is designed to reclassify illicit trafc as licit when both agents (AA and CA) can perceive it. Figure 3 illustrates the 
communication fow between agents in order to identify the legitimacy of the trafc coming from the machine hosting 
the CA. 
3.1 Lymph Node Algorithm 
The Lymph Node Algorithm was inspired by the structural characteristics of the lymphatic system and the cellular 
interactions that take place within the lymph node between DC cells, B lymphocytes and T lymphocytes. DC cells are 
responsible for perceiving cellular sufering on the tissues and migrate to the lymph nodes to report the perception to 
the T lymphocytes. These are responsible for receiving the DC signal and based on the proportion of danger perceived, 
they could initiate an immune response. The B lymphocyte is the cell responsible for the immune system memory, 
providing a quicker immune reaction when facing a new infection. 
The presence of antigens (a substance that induces specifc immune response) into the body tissues can indicate 
a potential hazard to the human body and a presence of biological agents that causes disease or illness to its host 
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AA perceives traffic from CA host
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Fig. 3. MADEX communication flow between agents 
(pathogens). However, a low concentration of antigens is not considered a threat to the organism. If the perception of 
the number of antigens is insignifcant to activate the T lymphocytes, they are rather unlikely to trigger an immune 
response. Although, if the T lymphocyte receives information about a large amount of a specifc antigen (in the Lymph 
Node Algorithm is represented as iSS), it would indicate that the body might be in danger, and will trigger an immune 
response. 
As described in [1], an essential part of human immune defence occurs in the lymphatic system, more specifcally in 
the lymph nodes, the place where the DCs migrate after recognising antigens to support the triggering of an immune 
response by lymphocytes T. The cellular interactions that occur within the lymph node inspired the present algorithm, 
because it refers to the unidirectional and segregated characteristic of the lymph, the fltering that occurs inside the 
lymph node, where an entity of the system is responsible for identifying signals (DC) in the body tissues and forward 
its perception to another entity (T lymphocyte). The latter will analyse the received information and seek to identify 
patterns that indicate ongoing malicious activities (Danger Signals) to take reasonable steps (immune response). 
We seek to simplify the dDGA so that it is possible to classify the network trafc to identify C2 channels and the 
machines that originate and receive the malicious trafc in real-time with the minimum intervention on the trafc fow. 
The Internet Protocol (IP) and its communication headers will serve as a source of information (tissue signals metaphor) 
to the detection mechanism because of its common use on the Internet. Signals are represented by IP packets addressed 
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to the external boundaries of the local network. All IP packets contain headers that among others bring information 
related to the source IP, destination IP and destination port. A signal header (S) structure can be represented as follows: 
� = {���������, ���{��, ���� }, ��� {��, ���� }} (1) 
According to [1], the activation of T lymphocytes requires recognition of antigen presented by DCs. This activation is 
dependent on signals perceived and expressed by the DCs to the T lymphocyte. Table 5 shows the correlation between 
the biological DC states with the corresponding computational model of signals in the Lymph Node algorithm: 
Table 5. Relationship between the states of biological DC and computational signals model on the lymph node algorithm 
Biological DC state Computational signals model 
semi-mature Licit signals 
mature Illicit signals 
When the DC is sufciently exposed to safe or danger signals, it become either mature or semi-mature respectively. 
A DC will become a mature cell if it has been predominantly exposed to signals that lead to danger to the body. If the 
DC has contact with signs that do not indicate danger, its status becomes semi-mature. 
Our Lymph Node Algorithm deals with three kinds of signals: 
(1) Licit Signals (LS): signals present into the tissue when a cell undergoes programmed death (apoptosis), which 
does not occur breakage of the plasma membrane. It is a sign that indicates no danger. This kind of signal leads 
to a semi-mature state of the DC. 
(2) Illicit Signals (IS): signals placed into the tissue by an unscheduled death of the cell, like when a disruption 
of the plasma membrane caused by heat, radiation, cold, trauma, bacteria, etc. The concentration of this signal 
drives the biological DC to a mature state, indicating the presence of an attacker causing damage or danger. 
(3) Similar Signals (SS): It is a sign with parameters similar to another signal already processed by the system. 
If a sign presents the same source IP, destination IP, and destination port of another signal seen before, it is 
considered a similar signal. Thus, Similar Signals can be Illicit Similar Signals (iSS) or Licit Similar Signals (lSS), 
according to the classifcation of the previous Similar Signal. These two kinds of Similar Signals are essential for 
the algorithm, as described next. 
There is a correspondence between the HIS and AIS as part of our lymph node metaphor. The Lymph Node Algorithm 
classifes signals as licit or illicit. In order to do such classifcation, it needs information from diferent machines. The 
algorithm was developed to meet the needs of this specifc MAS to address the research problem in this study. In 
Figure 4, we present an holistic view on how the input signal collected by a CA (mark 1) is presented to the AA, more 
specifcally at the Identifer Module. The B lymphocyte is the cell responsible for storing information about known 
pathogen patterns. 
Similar to the HIS, the Identifer module (T lymphocyte) within the the Lymph Node Algorithm interacts with the 
Memory module (B lymphocyte) to identify antigens. The signal is then analysed by the Identifer module and classifed 
as anomalous or normal. The output is stored in the memory module to support further analysis (mark 2). Finally, after 
processing, the output signal (mark 3) would be forwarded if it is classifed as normal signal or fltered if it is considered 
as an anomalous one. 
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Fig. 4. Lymph Node Algorithm structure and agents’ interaction 
We defne the processing of these signals as follows: 
Õ Õ 






Where LS, IS are input signals that are summed to obtain the calculated �� (Total of signals). �� will be compared to 
the limit of signals per execution (life cycle), which is a parameter used as a stop condition to generate the �� (Anomaly 
Index). �� is an output signal corresponding to the observed Anomaly index. iSS corresponds to Illicit Similar Signals, 
and max(iSS) is the greatest count of iSS. The �� is calculated for all groups of iSS (antigens). To accurately measure �� 
in our algorithm, we set an upper limit within which the detection is supported. We defne this threshold as the amount 
of 100 fltered signals by execution, which corresponds to the life cycle of T Lymphocyte in all scenarios examined. A 
predefned threshold is compared to �� at the end of a life cycle to decide if the Quarantine task is activated (immune 
response). In other words, if the �� is greater than the threshold, we probably have identifed a malicious C2 channel 
and the suspected network sockets. 
The main purpose of the generic version of Lymph Node Algorithm is to identify groups of iSS based on the 
interactions between agents. Our algorithm was developed using the extrusion detection approach [52], where its 
main goal is not to prevent infection but rather prevent data exfltration. Therefore, this algorithm entails that network 
trafc fows through the AA strategically positioned in the perimeter of the local network. Thus, positioning the CA in 
internal assets within the local network and the AA at the gateway, enables interactions to identify the trafc leaving 
the network (through the AA) and the type of trafc that the CA can or cannot perceive. If a machine that hosts a 
CA produces unknown trafc for itself, but is identifed by the AA at the network gateway, that constitutes evidence 
of malicious action obfuscated by rootkits. Our Lymph Node Algorithm pseudo-code related to both AA and CA is 
presented in the algorithms 1 and 2. 
The positioning of the CA in the internal assets of the local network and the AA at the exit of the network enables 
interactions between these two agents to identify the trafc that truly leaves the network (which is necessarily forwarded 
by the host where the AA is installed). 
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Algorithm 1 Lymph Node Algorithm (Auditor Agent) 
Require: Signal (S), threshold (Lim), Total of signals (Ts) 
Ensure: Anomaly index (�� ) for each iSS group 
1: if �� < 100 then 
2: if � ∈ ��������� then 
3: ������ .��������� (�)
4: ����� (�.���.��, �.���.����)
5: else if � ∈ � ℎ������� then 
6: � ������.(�)
7: else 
8: Query the CA corresponding to the IP that generated the signal if it perceives it and get a list of the CA known 
signals 
9: if Corresponding AA perceives S then 
10: ������.��������� (�)
11: ������ .� ℎ������� (�)
12: � ������ (�)
13: else 
14: ������ .��������� (�)
15: ����� (�.���.��, �.���.����)
16: end if 
17: end if 
18: else 
19: while �����.��������� (���) do 
20: MAX(iSS) = �����.��������� (���)
21: �� = MAX(iSS)/Ts 
22: if (�� > Lim) then 
23: Warn other nodes 
24: ���������� (�.���.��)
25: end if 
26: end while 
27: return all the calculated �� for each iSS group 
28: end if 
Algorithm 1 verifes if a new life cycle has started (line 1), then checks for a previous classifcation of the signal 
as Illicit, within the Blacklist (line 2). Performing this verifcation in early stages of the algorithm, we are aligned 
metaphorically with the HIS behaviour which use the immune memory to identify a second infection quickly. Next, the 
algorithm checks if the signal was identifed previously as Licit (line 5). If the signal is present at the Whitelist then the 
packet is forwarded. However, if the packet is not present at the Blacklist and in the Whitelist, the algorithm queries 
the CA that corresponds to the origin trafc IP if it perceives the outgoing trafc (line 9). If the signal (S) is perceived by 
the CA, it inserts it on the Whitelist and forwards the packet. To avoid race conditions caused by network delays or 
asynchronous implementations of the algorithm, when the query response is a perceived by the CA, we perform a 
reclassifcation removing it from the Blacklist and inserting it on the Whitelist (lines 10 and 11). If the query response is 
negative (the CA can’t perceive the trafc), the signal is inserted in the Blacklist and the packet is not forwarded (lines 
14 and 15). When we reach the life cycle stop condition (analysis of 100 packets), the algorithm groups the Blacklist 
entries by iSS (line 19) and calculates the �� for each group (line 21). If the calculated �� of the group is larger than the 
threshold parameter (which indicates Illicit signal saturation), the host that is originating the packet is Quarantined, and 
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the other nodes are Warned (lines 22 to 24). Finally, the algorithm returns all the �� calculated with the correspondent 
signal (line 27). 
Algorithm 2 Lymph Node Algorithm (Collector Agent) 
Require: Signal (S), threshold (Lim), Total of signals (Ts) 
Ensure: Response (Licit or Illicit Signal) 
1: if CA perceives S (referring to AA query) then 
2: return Licit Signal 
3: else 
4: return Illicit Signal 
5: end if 
6: Send all known S to the Whitelist 
7: report Whitelist updated to AA 
8: while �����.��������� (���) do 
9: MAX(iSS) = �����.��������� (���)
10: �� = MAX(iSS)/Ts 
11: if (�� > Lim) then 
12: Warn other nodes 
13: ���������� (�.���.��)
14: end if 
15: end while 
Algorithm 2 is executed in the AC. Its primary function and interaction with AA is to answer whether or not both 
agents perceive the same trafc. It is executed on-demand, when a query from the AA to confrm if the CA can perceive 
that its host is originating trafc to access assets outside the local network. If the CA can perceive the signal queried by 
the AA, it will respond that the signal is Licit, otherwise Illicit (lines 1 to 4). Next, it will populate the Whitelist with 
all the know signals (S) perceived and will inform to the AA that the Whitelist is updated (line 6 and 7). Finally, just 
like Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 calculates the �� for each iSS group (line 10), and start the defence routines. Certain �� 
indicate saturation of illicit signals, which metaphorically correspond to an immune response (lines 11 to 13). 
3.2 MADEX Level 1 
MADEX Level 1 is the basic level of the proposed architecture. This level is characterized by a shared database between 
AA and several CAs as shown in Figure 5. It is more suitable for less critical environments with substantial trafc 
volume because it presents fewer interactions between agents, and simplifed audit structures when compared to the 
MADEX level 2. 
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1 Assets output traffic
traffic origin CA populate memory 
module with perceived traffic3
4
AA run the Lymph Node Algorithm to 
diferentiate between licit or illicit traffic
2 AA perceives the traffic and asks traffic 
origin CA if it perceives the same 5
If AA or any CA decide the traffic is illict, it will 
warn other nodes to support the quarantine task
Licit traffic is forwarded to the destination 
network and illicit traffic is blocked 6
Assets input traffic7
Fig. 5. MADEX Level 1 architecture diagram 
3.3 MADEX Level 2 
The second level of MADEX mainly seeks to support the audit of the internal network, enabling identifcation of 
covert channels on all nodes of the internal network, even if the internal network’s AA is infected with a rootkit and 
generating malicious trafc, as shown in Figure 6. Trafc that has its origin inside a system on the internal network 
passes through the machine that is hosting the Internal AA, which forwards it to the machine where the External AA is 
installed, and fnally reaches to the Internet. The audit of the internal AA is possible with the strategic positioning 
of a CA that reports directly to the External AA located on the same host as the internal AA. In order to audit the 
internal level, the External AA must receive information about the interactions of the agents allocated in the internal 
network. However, for scalability purposes and performance improvement in the treatment packages, the exchange of 
information between levels is only carried out through consultations of the External AA to the database at the internal 
network (Figure 6 mark 8). Another problem with packet forwarding between levels is that the External AA receives 
the trafc coming from the internal network from the internal AA (Figure 6 mark 9). Therefore, it was necessary to 
create a mechanism that would identify for the External AA, which host of the internal network originated the trafc. 
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That trafc source identifcation was solved with an additional consultation to the internal network database. MADEX 
level 2 may be more appropriate for smaller networks where sensitive information is trafcked, because it presents 
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Fig. 6. MADEX Level 2 architecture diagram 
4 TESTBED SETUP AND PARAMETERS 
To validate the implementation and demonstrate the characteristics of the MADEX architecture, we defned a set of 
tests and experiments, which are fully described in this section. We sought to explore the capacity of handling real-time 
data of the implementation, as well as the sensitivity of the algorithm classifcation when exposed to real malicious 
trafc. To conduct the experiments a small-scale testbed was created with its hardware specifcations shown in Table 6. 
Computers were connected by a local area network, where they were exposed to diferent loads of trafc (licit and 
illicit) in several confgurations of the MADEX architecture. The machines available for testing had only one network 
interface, a fact that limited the amount of trafc that the External AA can receive. 
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Table 6. MADEX testbed configuration 
Units Function Description 
4 Collector Agent Linux Ubuntu 14.04 Desktop 32 bits, DELL Optiplex 960, CORE 2 Duo, 3 GHz, 2GB RAM, 
HD 240 GB and 1 NIC 
2 Auditor Agent Linux Ubuntu 14.04 Desktop 32 bits, DELL Optiplex 960, CORE 2 Duo, 3 GHz, 2GB RAM, 
HD 240 GB and 1 NIC 
1 Adversary Virtual Private Server (VPS) Linux Ubuntu Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS 64 bits, HD SCSI 20 GB, 2 
GB RAM, 2 NIC 
1 Switch 16-Port Gigabit Ethernet Switch 
With regards to the malicious activities and code utilised to validate our implementation, Netcat [31], a TCP/IP utility 
which reads and writes data across network connections was used to support data exfltration activities. To conceal 
the malicious trafc, we used a kernel-level rootkit named Suteresu [21]. The selection of this rootkit to be part of the 
experiments was motivated by its ability to hide network trafc at the kernel-level (See Table 4). Additionally, its source 
code is open, allowing the faithful replication of the experiment. The illicit activity of data exfltration was performed 
by a TCP/IP connection to a server located at the Internet. It consists of 1514 byte text message, which was sent at the 
following time intervals: 01 request every 5 minutes, 01 request every 1 minute, 01 request every 30 seconds and 01 
request every 10 seconds. We also emphasise on the controlled real malicious trafc generated in a pre-defned network 
topology. Our topology is based on a number of real-machines operating on a real network. 
4.1 Experiment scenarios 
We devise two groups of experiments to test the efcacy of MADEX: 1) Performance saturation-based and 2) Classifcation-
based experiments. Metaphorically speaking the DC identify and collect illicit signal samples. So these cells are exposed 
in the human body tissues to input signs, and when a DS is perceived, the DC cell migrates to a lymph node and report 
the DS to the T lymphocyte which will decide if the amount of DS reported by the DCs is enough to start an immune 
response. That cycle is repeated in a certain number of times (life cycle). In all the experiments carried out, a life cycle 
corresponds to the treatment of 100 packages which is a partial result based on trafc observation, and the execution 
of an experiment is equal to 100 life cycles. Therefore, at the end of an experiment, 10,000 packages will have been 
processed in the outermost AA. 
In the performance saturation tests, our main objective was to gradually increase the amount of trafc to observe the 
maximum capacity of the system in terms of real-time packet processing. Three diferent confgurations where used. 
We started with 01 CA generating trafc with pre-defned time intervals between HTTP and HTTPS. The time interval 
used between requests was 1sec, 3sec, 5sec and 10sec respectively. Next, we performed the same experiment with 02 
and 03 CAs connected to one AA. So, the worst-case scenario with regards to trafc load and data process was 03 CAs 
connected to 01 AA, and every CA request a diferent site every second, as presented in Table 7. 
The frequency intervals were increased progressively based on the capacity of our implementation to handle 
connections. Our objective was to reach the maximum trafc load limit, which is indicated by the malfunction of the 
system, when it starts to classify all trafc as illicit. Discussions about the aforementioned malfunction process is 
discussed in Section 5. 
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Table 7. MADEX Level 1 performance saturation tests scenarios and trafic load 
For Saturation tests with MADEX level 2, in the external network we had an AA (External AA) connected to an CA 
(CA 1) in the internal network and an AA (Internal AA) connected to two CAs in the internal network (CA 2 and 3). 
The trafc load was the same as the experiments for MADEX level 1 (Table 8). 
Table 8. MADEX Level 2 performance saturation tests scenarios and trafic load 
Confguration Trafc load 
Scenario 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
The same scenarios and trafc load were also used in the saturation tests were used in the early stages of the 
classifcation tests, where the objective was to identify the false-positive aspects of our implementation (no malicious 
trafc was applied). 
In the second phase of the detection test experiments, the malicious trafc was inserted to confrm if the MADEX 
architecture Level 1 can diferentiate between licit and illicit trafc. Table 9, shows the description of the scenarios 
tested. 
In order to enable the detection of malicious activities that come from the internal network in the MADEX architecture 
level 2, it is necessary that the Internal AA host forwards all trafc coming from the internal network to the machine 
where the External AA is installed. In Table 10 we show the description of the scenarios for the MADEX Level 2 testing 
parameters. 



























































































































































































Scenario 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Scenario 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Scenario 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Table 9. Detection test scenarios description for MADEX level 1 
Scenario Description Objectives 
Scenario 1 01 AA connected to 01 CA installed at an in-
fected host that generate licit and illicit trafc. 
Verify if the implementation can diferentiate 




01 AA connected to 02 CAs. Just one host is 
infected and generates licit and illicit trafc; the 
other host just generates licit trafc. 
01 AA connected to 02 CAs. Both hosts are in-
fected and generate licit and illicit trafc. 
Check if the implementation can classify mali-
cious trafc from multiple hosts when just one 
host is generating illicit signals 
Confrm if the implementation can diferenti-
ate between diferent kinds of iSS coming from 
diferent hosts 
Table 10. Testing scenarios description for MADEX level 2 
Scenario Description Objectives 
Scenario 1 01 CA infected at external network Verify if the External AA can identify malicious 
trafc coming from a External CA. 
Scenario 2 01 CA infected at internal network Check if the External AA can identify a host lo-
cated in the Internal network that is generating 
illicit signals. 
Scenario 3 01 CA infected at external network and 01 CA Confrm if the External AA can diferentiate 
infected at internal network between malicious trafc originated from the 
internal network and from the external network 
and identify the hosts that are generating it. 
Scenario 4 The internal AA host is infected. One CA who Identify if the External AA is able to audit the 
reports directly to the External AA is installed Internal AA, recognizing when the latter is pro-
in the same host ducing malicious trafc. 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Performance saturation tests 
Our frst experiment with MADEX level 1 was to discover how much data was processed in real-time. The implementation 
has been subjected to test runs were the trafc and quantity of CAs where increased gradually. We performed 12 
executions of saturation tests at level 1 (each of the three confgurations was subjected to the 4 cited trafc load 
presented in Table 7), whose data are shown in Table 11. On the performed tests, one overload situation on the treatment 
of packets was only observed in the scenario that consists of 3 collectors who received new requests every second. 
The average response delay was measured in all agents during the experiments. In the AA average response delay 
measurement, the time diference between the request to the CA and the received response was calculated. The 
metric used to measure the CA average response time was the interval between the request made by the AA and the 
confrmation of the CA’s response by the AA. Based on the time diferences cited for each type of agent, it was clear 
that an increase in the list of active connections infuenced the CA’s response time considerably. This is due to the fact 
that the CA must iterate through the whole list of active connections in the worst case scenario. 
In cases where the CA has an excessive trafc load to process, it starts to increase the response time to the AA, 
culminating into a system malfunction. This behaviour arises because when the collector spends too much time seeking 
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for the trafc queried by the AA into the host list of active connections, and eventually the referred trafc does not 
exist anymore. Therefore, the CA cannot fnd correspondence into the list of active connections and the system starts 
to identify all trafc as illicit, thus, increasing the rate of false positives. 
The average time of the collectors’ response tends to increase the upper limit of the average response time of 
collectors in these conditions. This increase in collector’s workload was also partially attributed to the heterogeneous 
kind of the trafc used in our experiments. Given that we sought to determine the maximum capacity of trafc that 
could be imposed on the system and the precise performance saturation, requests were generated for diferent domains 
in order to expose the implementation of the worst case for the workload on the CA. The increase in trafc due to 
the frequency of the requests tends to increase the list of active connections known by the host. That consequently 
reduces the time it takes for the system to list and update the database (both in linear time O(n)). We also observed that 
the system demonstrates good operation with an average delay response time of the collectors lower than 135ms and 
amount of trafc passing by the auditor of 650 packets per second. These limits were adopted as maximum parameters 
for other experiments in MADEX level 1. 
Table 11. MADEX level 1 performance tests 
1 Collector 2 Collectors 3 Collectors 
Freq. Intervals Packets/s Average delay (ms) Packets/s Average delay (ms) Packets/s Average delay (ms) 
10Sec 54.169 19.311 81.149 27.434 133.355 63.759 
5Sec 109.749 46.867 188.798 67.443 267.476 91.596 
3Sec 165.132 51.948 298.752 61.641 650.966 136.777 
1Sec 459.886 61.867 614.667 71.878 1698.34 596.450 
The results for both versions of MADEX architecture with regards to performance saturation are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. MADEX level 2 performance tests 
MADEX level 1 MADEX level 2 
Freq. Intervals Packets/s Average delay (ms) Packets/s Average delay (ms) 
10sec 112.024 36.267 143.888 48.765 
5sec 221.393 52.909 286.914 58.896 
3sec 346.275 81.121 507.391 89.702 
1sec 854.520 119.512 1358.643 697.875 
With the MADEX level 2 saturation tests, the AA manifests a behaviour similar to what was observed in the saturation 
experiment with MADEX level 1. However, the average number of packets that the external AA is capable of processing 
was degraded. This occurs because the External AA need to interact directly with the CAs that are on his level and 
process all connections that come from the internal network. Therefore, an increase in workload and response time was 
expected. Finally, it was necessary that the External AA can perceive which asset was generating trafc coming from 
the internal network. This requirement was met by an additional request from the External AA to the internal network 
database (represented by the arrow 8 in Figure 6) to support the identifcation of the trafc origin coming from the 
internal network. 
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5.2 Classification tests 
In the frst phase of the classifcation experiments we sought to identify the false-positive rate that the system generates 
when there is an absence of illicit trafc using the same scenario and trafc load as presented in Table 7. We executed 
12 rounds of false-positive tests at level 1 (3 scenarios subjected to four trafc loads, where a total of 40,000 packets 
were analysed by the AA), where we found variations in false-positive rate of 0.01% to 0.11% as shown in Table 13. 
In the scenario that was composed of 3 collectors that received new requests every second, the system presented 
malfunctioning due to the trafc load compromising the classifcation mechanism, which started to classify mistakenly 
as illicit all new connections perceived by the AA. 
Table 13. MADEX level 1 False Positives tests 





















Results in Table 14 indicate that if more consecutive life cycles are taken into consideration for the classifcation of 
illicit connections, the lower the number of false positives reported by our system. 
Table 14. MADEX level 1 False Positives (considering consecutive life cycles) 
MADEX level 1 
No. of life cycles 1 Collector 2 Colletors 3 Collectors 
1 15 33 33 
2 1 2 3 
3 0 0 -
For MADEX level 2 false positives tests, we opted for a model in which the exchange of information between levels 
were only made by the AA immediately outermost level through consultations with the innermost level neighbour 
database. Similarly to the previous experiment that only implements MADEX level 1, we observed that the implemen-
tation had a degradation on the trafc classifcation performance in the case where it is unable to process incoming 
information on time. During our experiments, saturation symptoms were manifested when: (1) requests were made 
every second with 3 CA spread in two levels, (2) the experiment discontinued when the level 2 CA showed a recurring 
increase of average response time and started to classify all trafc perceived as illicit and fnally, (3) exceptions were 
made to the trafc that had been classifed by the Internal AA as licit. During the experiments with MADEX level 2 
under normal system operation, the false-positive rate variations are from 0.01% to 0.07% as shown in Table 15. 
In the MADEX level 2 false-positive experiment, where consecutive life cycles were considered for the execution of 
the Warning and Quarantine tasks, we observed that as the number of consecutive life cycles increases, the lower is the 
number of false positives, as illustrated in Table 16. 
In the second phase of the classifcation experiments, the malicious trafc is inserted into the tests, where at least 
one network participant is infected and generate illicit trafc. To test the ability to diferentiate between licit and illicit 
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Table 15. MADEX level 2 False Positives tests 
















Table 16. MADEX level 2 False Positives (considering consecutive life cycles) 
Level 1 Level 2 
1 Life cycle 
2 Life cycles 







network trafc, it was necessary to generate these two types of trafc in the experiment. We tested the performance 
with Licit trafc at intervals of 10 seconds between requests with Illicit trafc being hidden by a real rootkit. Results 
obtained in the false positives experiments, show that the highest amount of iSS found at the end of a life cycle observed 
in normal system behaviour conditions was 3 iSS. Then we defned 3 as the iSS maximum value (Lim) threshold for 
detecting malicious activity in this environment, plus the half of that value rounded up. That allowed us to calculate the 
fnal parameter (Threshold) to identify malicious trafc hidden by rootkits as the amount of 5 iSS. This additional safety 
margin to the maximum value iSS seeks to avoid false positives. We performed a total of 12 experiments, where all 
scenarios were exposed to four charges of licit and illicit trafc. We chose not to use the anomaly index, but the amount 
of iSS, because MADEX preserves iSS between cycles, given that a slower and detailed attack as an APT infection for 
example, would go unnoticed if this information was not cumulative. We also observed that MADEX is sensitive to 
trafc variations (frequency and volume), and is able to identify malicious activities faster (fewer cycles) when exposed 
to a higher frequency of illicit trafc, as can be seen in Table 17. 
Table 17. Malicious activities detection in relation to the frequency and volume of malicious trafic 
Malicious trafc Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Requests every 5 minutes 11 cycles 18 cycles 20 cycles 
Requests every 1 minute 2 cycles 5 cycles 6 cycles 
Requests every 30 seconds 2 cycles 2 cycles 1 cycle 
Requests every 10 seconds 1 cycle 1 cycle 1 cycle 
In all scenarios examined, our implementation was able to diferentiate licit and illicit trafc and identify the source 
IP, destination IP and destination port. We also tested the system in the presence of two C2 channels with active data 
exfltration activities ongoing, and the architecture was able to identify and diferentiate both covert channels. Figure 7 
illustrates the detection test results of the frst scenario where a CA at the external network generate illicit trafc every 
fve minutes. When analysing the graph referring to the amount of iSS in relation to the life cycles in External AA, we 
can see clearly the constant characteristic of malicious trafc present on the external network (volume and frequency). 
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We notice a variation in the frequency of malicious trafc on consecutive experiments for the frst scenario, where the 
higher the frequency and volume of malicious trafc in relation to constant licit trafc, the lower the number of life 
cycles required for detection of malicious activity. 























Fig. 7. MADEX Level 2 detection test at Scenario 01, malicious trafic every 5 minutes 
In the second scenario (Figure 8), we introduced a communication mechanism between levels for the External AA, to 
obtain the source machine of the malicious trafc even in cases where it is coming from the internal network. Our 
implementation identifed the presence of illicit trafc in internal and external networks. In scenario 3, we introduce 
a compromised machine on the internal network and one on the external network. In all tests, our implementation 
was able to diferentiate the illicit trafc originated from the internal as well as the external network. In scenario 4, we 
monitor MADEX ability to detect malicious trafc from the internal network when the host of the internal AA was 
compromised. In this case, we installed a CA on the machine responsible for the trafc routing on the internal network 
that reports directly to the External AA, as shown in Figure 9. 
In order to audit the Internal Auditor Agent (AA Int), the CA Ext, a CA that report directly to the External Auditor 
Agent (AA Ext), is positioned in the same machine that hosts the AA Int to collect trafc information leaving the 
internal network (See Figure 6). If the internal network gateway is compromised and hiding malicious trafc, the CA 
Ext will not be able to perceive the trafc leaving the internal LAN. However, when the malicious trafc reaches the 
External Auditor Agent (AA Ext), it will be perceived by the latter which will check if the CA Ext is aware of the trafc, 
resulting in the detection of illicit signals originated from the internal gateway machine. Therefore, detection only 
will occur in the external network as expected. Tables 18 and 19 present the confusion matrix of the experiments for 
MADEX Level 2 respectively. In this case, positive and negative values are related to licit and illicit signs respectively. 
Thus, for the calculation of the matrices, only the experiments involving malicious trafc were considered. 
In terms of false-negatives, we considered experiments in which malicious trafc was generated at constant time 
intervals. Therefore, the total amount of iSS identifed by MADEX was compared with the amount of malicious trafc 
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Fig. 8. MADEX Level 2 detection test at Scenario 02, malicious trafic every minute 





















Fig. 9. MADEX Level 2 detection test at Scenario 04, malicious trafic every 30 seconds 
expected in the experiment based on the execution time. We observe that the actual amount of illicit trafc identifed 
was lower than expected in most cases; this error has increased with the amount of illicit trafc. This diference was 
recorded because the experiments have been conducted in a real environment, where data exfltration took place in a 
network with high trafc rate, so the experiment was subject to network delays and packets drops. 
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Table 18. MADEX level 1 confusion matrix 
Positive Negative 
Positive 23.001 297 
Negative 5 1599 
Table 19. MADEX level 2 confusion matrix 
Positive Negative 
Positive 22.790 3.791 
Negative 128 10.010 
The infuence of these metrics inherent in networks have adversely afected the classifcation and increased the rate 
of false-negatives. However, MADEX level 1 still obtained an error rate of 1.21%, an accuracy of 98.78% and a sensitivity 
of 99.97%. In the cases where MADEX 2 was deployed, we obtained an error rate of 1.65%, an accuracy of 98.34% and 
a sensitivity of 99.94%. We argue for both the efectiveness and suitability of MADEX under burst trafc conditions 
under the scenarios examined. Our MADEX architecture was also proved to be sensitive to the frequency and volume 
of illicit trafc. The higher the volume and frequency on the C2 channel, the faster the data exfltration processes were 
discovered. The audit strategy for Internal CA directly connected to the external AA demonstrated to be efective, 
but the overall trafc handling capacity of the system was slightly degraded. We report MADEX performance against 
existing state-of-the-art detection approaches using the three main metrics, namely, error rate, accuracy and sensitivity 
in Table 20. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This work proposes an architecture that uses the intersection of information about the connections that compromised 
systems perceive against actual trafc fows to identify hidden malicious streams in ultra-low, high-speed infrastructures 
such as the Tactile Internet. Our MADEX architecture demonstrates a certain degree of resilience and reliability when 
subjected to excessive network delays and trafc aggregation processes. It manages to identify trafc related to malicious 
activities for specifc data exfltration criteria against which it was exposed and tested. In addition, MADEX does 
not require prior knowledge of the characteristics or behaviours of malicious code, nor need to perform deep packet 
inspection while it maintains a protocol-agnostic and privacy-friendly operation supported by a simple algorithm which 
requires low computational cost. Moreover, due to the distributed characteristic of multi-agent systems allied with 
interactions between entities inspired by the human immune system, it is possible to create accurate measurements and 
metrics regarding the temporal, frequency, volume and attribution of nodes that support covert channels activities. 
To the extent of our knowledge, this is the frst paper that addresses the detection of trafc information hidden by 
real rootkits near real-time with an AIS approach. We argue that such an approach ft the strict malware detection 
requirements posted by network infrastructures such as the Tactile Internet and its applications. We currently work 
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towards incorporating asset reaction modelling and fow-based analysis in MADEX to further optimise its capability to 
detect more complex covert channels for data exfltration purposes. 



















































































MADEX Level 1 Architecture 1.21% 98.78% 99.97% ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
MADEX Level 2 Architecture 1.65% 98.34% 99.94% ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Aboughadareh and Csallner* N/A N/A N/A ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Musavi and Kharrazi** N/A 98.15% N/A ✓ 
Tian et al. (Random Forest) 3,25% 96.74% 95.13% ✓ 
Geetha Ramani and Suresh Kumar 70.31% 29.68% 22.41% ✓ 
* The authors claim 10% of False Positives and 100% of True Positives 
** The authors claim 3% of False Positives and 0.6% of False Negatives 
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